ATIONS, LIKE INDIVIDUALS
our two countries if the introduction of a change in the system and the transition to a totalitarian form of government could be linked in any way with German support. The German government wishes to avoid any conspicuous measures, such as the sending of a staff of advisors before any such change had taken place.6
Replying for the Foreign Office, Weizsacker also cautioned Wendler to avoid a rift with Busch and said that the question of advisors could be considered later. He suggested that Wendler make clear he did not speak for the other anti-Comintern powers and that his future cables on the subject not be addressed to the Fuhrer and the Chancellor.
As promised, President Busch ended the constitutional government and established a dictatorship on April 24. Thereafter, his government introduced revolutionary decrees including a new labor code and controls over all foreign exchange arising from tin sales. Busch's suicide in August 1939 ended his revolutionary program and any hopes of comprehensive support from Nazi Germany. Within a few years, the MNR leadership enshrined Busch as an honored hero in the Party's pantheon of precursors.
This early Bolivian exchange with the Nazis is significant not for what it produced in itself but rather as an indicator of the tenuous nature of the Bolivian-German relationship and the limited capacity of the two powers to meet each other's needs. President Busch's primary preoccupation was with Bolivia's domestic problems and keeping his own government and program afloat. The diplomatic exchanges give no sign of any German controlled mass movement. Busch was reaching out desperately for help wherever he could find it. And the German Foreign Office, while not wishing to dash cold water on the hopes of a potential ally, was clearly wary of open-ended involvements, the cost and repercussions of which could not be predicted.
After Busch's death, tradition-minded military leaders took over and Bolivia's old elite, the "Rosca," returned fully to power with the election of General Penfaranda to the presidency in L940. The new government, closely linked to the tin interests, was more sympathetic to the United States and Great Britain.
The "Nazi-Putsch" In part, this action resulted from national indignation over government charges that the company was guilty of tax evasion and had illegally exported oil to Argentina. In addition, the company had not provided the assistance the government desired during the Chaco War (1932-35). The government's anti-imperialist stand appeared to temper national frustrations and disappointments over defeat in the war.7
Many of the men who later founded and led the MNR were among the sponsors and supporters of the seizure.8 Victor Paz Estenssoro, Under Secretary of Treasury in the Toro government, spoke out strongly in defense of the "nation's resources" (linking oil with the tin question) and supported efforts of t-he subsequent Busch regime to control the large tin companies and enforce the decree against Standard Oil.9 The founders of the MNR charged that Standard Oil was attempting to recover possession of its oil rights and properties, not simply seeking indemnification. They signed a manifesto in July 1941 opposing any change in the disposition of the case.10 The MNR men stuck firmly to their guns partly because the oil dispute related to their "anti-imperialist" position on tin and to the important principle that Bolivia should control its own natural resources rather than let them be exploited by foreign countries.
This fierce and open opposition to Standard Oil's claims brought the MNR into direct conflict with the United States government. The latter was concerned not simply with securing compensation for a single private U.S. company, but with the principle of compensation since the U.S. had so much property at stake in Latin America.
The Bolivian oil controversy also had far wider political and strategic implications. As the war clouds gathered in Europe, the U.S. was concerned about access to oil in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, the U.S. needed a good working relationship with the Bolivian government in order to insure easy access to tin, the Asian sources of which were first threatened and later cut off during the war. After hostilities broke out in Europe, the U.S. became increasingly pre- occupied with control of Axis nationals in Bolivia and elsewhere in the Americas. To encourage cooperation in continental defense, Washington was prepared to provide extensive economic assistance to Bolivia, but it was awkward to reward a government which had refused to cooperate with the United States in arranging compensation for the confiscated Standard Oil property.
Tempted by the prospects of economic assistance and less committed to the move against Standard Oil than its predecessor governments, the Pefiaranda administration which took office in 1940 sought a compromise with the United States. Unable to command a majority in the Congress, the Pefiaranda administration feared flying in the face of political opposition, including the MNR, especially in view of public sentiments against giving in to Standard Oil.
As the world conflict deepened in the summer of 1941, both governments were seeking a pretext for resolving the dispute over the Standard Oil properties in order to clear the way for Bolivian participation in hemispheric defense and in the expected economic benefits associated therewith. The so-called "Nazi Putsch" episode of July 1941 set the stage for the realization of these objectives.
The origin of the episode was an alleged plot to overthrow the Bolivian government. On the morning of July i8, 1941, Douglas Jenkins, the U.S. minister in La Paz, gave Foreign Minister Ostria Gutierrez a photocopy of what purported to be a letter addressed to the German minister in La Paz, Wendler, from Major Ellas Belmonte, the Bolivian military attache in Berlin.-1 The letter declared that "the time is approaching to carry out our coup to liberate my poor country from a weak government of completely capitalist inclinations." The letter also recommended that the coup take place in the middle of July and it proposed the concentration of "our forces" in Cochabamba.12 Jenkins said that the source of the information merited full confidence, but that the Department of State was unable to guarantee the authenticity of the signature because Belmonte's signature was unknown in the Department.
Belmonte On the basis of the document supplied by Jenkins and of other political and security considerations, the Penfaranda government decided on July 19, 1941 to declare the German minister persona non grata and expel him from the country. Belmonte was dismissed from the army effective July 24 for "treason" while still in Germany.14 Also, the government declared a state of siege throughout Bolivia to cope with the supposed insurrectionary threat.
The Bolivian government charged that Nazi-Fascists in Bolivia were preparing to overthrow the government as part of Nazi German/s efforts to establish her hegemony in Bolivia and to engulf the entire continent. Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary of State, indicated the existence of evidence against the German minister and publicly supported the Bolivian government's actions.15 Washington interpreted the Bolivian government's prompt and decisive action in nipping the alleged coup in the bud as solid evidence of Bolivia's intention to collaborate with the United States in continental defense against the mounting Axis menace.
Under powers deriving from the state of siege, the government closed three periodicals published by leaders of the MNR, including the daily, La Calle. A group of military officers and civilians were arrested and imprisoned, figuring among the latter the MNR leaders Armando Arce, Walter Guevara Arze, Carlos Montenegro, and Augusto Cespedes. Some were imprisoned for up to several months. Vlctor Paz Estenssoro and others of their associates who were members of congress were spared arrest because of parliamentary immunity. The government's action associated those arrested with "Nazi Fascism" in the public mind and temporarily silenced some of the government's most vocal critics.
On August i, ten days after the alleged "Putsch" and the government's efforts to suppress it had been made public, the Bolivian minister in Washington received a note from the Department of State proposing a long-term plan of collaboration "to foster continued mutually beneficial economic relations between the United States and Bolivia and to develop the national economy and national resources tells me in strictest secrecy (repeat secrecy) that having been unable to get possession of German pouch, documents were manufactured and given to Bolivian authorities. He believes these papers which he describes as "works of arf' were basic influence in Bolivian Government's action over the week end but admits possibility that genuinely incriminating evidence may also have been uncovered in La Paz.
My informant whose operative in Bolivia is I am told an American engineer John L. Middleton declares he has told no one but me, not even British Minister. The latter in discussing Bolivian events with me this morning stated he proposed to capitalize on incident in conversation with Colombian Foreign Minister and expressed hope I would do likewise.27
The informant described in telegram 209 was a former "honorary attache to the British legation at Havana" who was "largely concerned with intelligence work."28 Meanwhile, the Bolivian government's revelation of the "plot" had thrown the German legation into an uproar, and there was a flurry of coded diplomatic cables between La Paz and Berlin. I have reviewed hundreds of these messages, none of which give any indication that the letter was authentic. In a confidential telegram dated July 2o Wendler asserted that "The charges against the legation are The message expressed concern that Wendler might be "compromised" and to indicate whether there was any evidence against him. Wendler's reply on July 27 was once The falsification of the Belmonte-Wendler letter was one of the clever and successful intelligence operations of World War II. The British-arranged maneuver eventually led to the elimination of German influence in Bolivia and her closer association with the United Nations. Since Bolivia was one of the nations with closest ties to Argentina, the former's expulsion of the German Minister was a landmark in the British campaign to isolate Argentina and bring the rest of the American nations over to the Allied side. Perhaps, even more important, the British maneuver deeply committed the still neutral U.S., which served as the channel for the delivery of the forged document, to mobilizing the Latin American nations against Germany. The Bolivian government declared war on the Axis in April 1943.
I have uncovered no evidence that the United States deliberately sought to discredit the MNR leaders at this time, and no reference was made to the MNR leaders in the so-called Belmonte-Wendler letter. Nevertheless, the effect of the "Nazi Putsch" episode was precisely that. The 'Nazi Putsch" provided the Bolivian government with an opportunity to jail the MNR leaders, silence the MNR press, put the opposition on the defensive, and gave color to the Bolivian government's charge that the MNR was pro-Nazi. United States is the first power, not only of the New World but also of the old, and must exercise her hegemony on the continent, not only in the economic order, but also in military. And this not because she responds to a deliberate and optional imperialist principle of a political tendency, but because she responds to naturally determined factors . . . Since the United States became involved with one side in the present war, and since we are an economically dependent country, Bolivia could not, and cannot, for its own interest, be against the United States.62
In order to show that his present opinion was not a result of Axis defeats, he referred to his earlier statement in 1941 after the "Nazi Putsch," that "America, willy nilly, has been democratic, like the United States. Moreover, the shipment of our raw materials to Germany . . . is ridiculous: how should we send them? By air? By submarine, from Lake Titicaca?"63
The Villarroel government's hasty efforts to reassure the U.S. immediately upon assuming power were the first testimony of its willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in the war. To be sure, Foreign Minister Tamayo sought briefly and unsuccessfully to build an independent southern bloc of Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia once the U.S. After leaving the Department of State, Duggan made public his views on some of the controversial matters bearing on U.S. policy towards Bolivia. For example, he said the Penfaranda government was "corrupt, thoroughly discredited as a tool to mining interests, [and] has permitted all sorts of activity beneficial to the Axis." With regard to the MNR and Germany, Duggan said that "the MNR leaders were glad to accept Nazi subsidies for their newspapers in exchange for printing the Nazi version of the war news. The United States thus justifiably began to regard them as Nazi agents, though purely domestic factors determined the origin and main purposes of the move- Although not an impartial observer (he had been imprisoned in the "Nazi Putsch" and forced out of the cabinet in 1944), Augusto Cespedes was in a position to judge the impact of the non-recognition policy. According to him, "Non-recognition wounded the Villarroel government incurably. Obliged to reduce the collaboration of the MNR and to compensate with an apolitical policy, its revolutionary impetus checked, and economically sabotaged, it lost its popular force."75 Offbalance and on the defensive from the start, the Villarroel regime never was able to establish itself firmly even after the MNR returned to the cabinet in 1945. Most of the charges in the 86 page pamphlet were made against the Argentine military government in an effort to discredit the Peron group in advance of the presidential elections scheduled in March. The charges included "collaboration with enemy agents for important espionage and other purposes," creation of a "Nazi-Fascist state," and conspiring with the enemy to "undermine governments in neighboring states." In the latter connection two pages were devoted to reiterating the charges against Belmonte and others. It is doubtful that the Department of State would have published such a statement solely and expressly to damage the Villarroel government, but it clearly was willing to discredit that government in pursuit of its campaign against Per6n. Before the Blue Book was published the United States had maintained normal diplomatic relations with the Villarroel government for a year and a half; at the time, the war against Germany had been over for eight months. As a result, the impact on public opinion in Bolivia was profound. Cespedes interpreted the State Department's "slander" as giving the green light to proceed with a conspiracy against Villarroel.76
Tensions between the United States and the Villarroel government continued to mount in 1946. The story of the relations between the two governments during the balance of Villarroel's presidency lies outside the scope of this article, and will be discussed in another manuscript on U.S.-Latin American policy now being prepared for publication. Villarroel was overthrown and murdered on July 19, 1946.
Conclusions
In one sense, it seems remarkable that a letter fabricated by British intelligence could have had such a far-reaching impact on U.S. policy, and that the Department of State policy was so profoundly influenced by unproven or exaggerated charges. On the other hand, the passions of World War II were often blinding; the State Department would have had difficulty in resisting the patriotic imperatives of the day even had it so wished. Under such influences, large-power 76. Ibid., p. 207.
protestations of non-interference in domestic affairs often have a hollow ring. It would be hard to find a more dramatic case of foreign political influences being used to determine the composition of another country's government than the U.S. non-recognition policy towards Villarroel in 1944. Great Powers have great power and often use it when they judge, correctly or not, that their security is threatened.
Retrospective appraisal of the MNR's early policies shows the heavy price the movement paid for intransigence on the issues arising from the expropriation of Standard Oil's properties, and its unwillingness to come out earlier and stronger behind the United Nations in the war. From the beginning the MNR leaders insisted that tin, not oil, was the main question. But by directing their political fire at oil as well as tin interests, t-hey incited the opposition of the powerful Standard Oil Company and the U.S. government, and helped array them both on the side of their political enemies. Standard Oil's explorations had been a failure, there were no producing fields of significance, and the issue was largely symbolic for both sides. The United States government permitted itself to be used as a channel for British intelligence in 1941 partly because of Bolivian, including MNR, opposition to the compromise oil settlement. Without these antecedents, it is difficult to see how the U.S. could have carried through its non-recognition policy of 1944, or its subsequent policies, all of which were so damaging to the MNR's first major effort in national leadership.
The fabricated Belmonte-Wendler letter served the immediate purposes of Britain and the U.S. very well indeed, especially since these were confirmed by the outbreak of war with Germany a few months later. The MNR leaders were, in part, its innocent victims. Thereafter, the U.S. anti-Nazi campaign in Bolivia appears to have hampered rather than promoted U.S. purposes. By late 1943 and 1944 the MNR knew that Germany had lost the war and its leader, Paz Estenssoro, had long since decided that Bolivia had no choice but to collaborate with the U.S. As a result, t-he non-recognition policy represented an unnecessary and costly diversion of effort and caused long-term misconceptions and distortions in American policy. Charging the MNR with Nazi Fascism and making that label stick was a major part of the strategy of the tin mining and other traditional interests in Bolivia. In a sense, the United States was used to help sustain exaggerated and false charges, and was thus arrayed on the side of traditional interests against a reformist opposition. Nor can 
